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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e®ects of monetary policy shock when there is a non-
negative constraint on the nominal interest rate. I employ two algorithms: the piece-
wise linear solution and Holden and Paetz's (2012) algolithm (the HP algorithm).
I apply these methods to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
which has sticky prices, sticky wages, and adjustment costs of investment. The main
¯ndings are as follows. First, the impulse responses obtained with the HP algorithm
do not di®er much from those obtained with the piecewise linear solution. Second,
the non-negative constraint in°uences the e®ects of monetary policy shocks under
the Taylor rule under some parameters. In contrast, the constraint has little e®ects
on the response to money growth shocks. Third, wage stickiness contributes to the
e®ects of the non-negative constraint through the marginal cost of the product.
The result of money growth shock suggests that it is important to analyze the
e®ects of the zero lower bound (ZLB) in a model which generates a signi¯cant liq-
uidity e®ect.
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e®ect
JEL Classi¯cation: E47; E49; E52
yPh.D student, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
E-mail: 100e107e@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp.
I would like to thank Toshiki Jinushi, Shigeto Kitano, Teruyoshi Kobayashi, Junya Masuda, Keiya
Minamimura, Atsushi Miyake, Masahiko Shibamoto, Shingo Umino and other seminar participants at
Kobe University and Kobe Gakuin University for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction
After the colossal ¯nancial crisis in 2008, the short term nominal interest rates stayed
at zero. This prompts the question of how the zero lower bound (ZLB) in°uences the
e®ects of monetary policy shocks. Many papers have derived the impulse responses and
analyzed the economic behaviors in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
literature, but most of that research did not include the non-negative constraint on
nominal interest rates. This paper analyzes the e®ects of monetary policy shocks when
there is a non-negative constraint on nominal interest rates in a typical DSGE framework.
Several authors have described models including a non-negative constraint on nom-
inal interest rates in the optimal monetary policy literature. Their analyses focused
on how to avoid going into the liquidity trap and on the e®ectiveness of monetary pol-
icy through expected in°ation1.(Eggertsson and Woodford 2003 , Kato and Nishiyama
2005, Adam and Billi 2006, 2007, Nakov 2008). More recent analyses used a strand
of occasionally binding constraint to tackle non-linear problem.(Christiano, et al. 2010 ,
Fern¶andez-Villaverde, et al. 2012, Nakata 2012) The studies in both the DSGE literature
and the optimal monetary policy literature did not analyze the e®ects of monetary policy
shocks when there is a non-negative constraint on the nominal rate of interest.
Holden and Paetz (2012) created an algorithm dealing with the ZLB. Holden and
Paetz's algorithm (henceforth, the HP algorithm) employs news shocks (Holden and
Paetz called these the \shadow shock") to deal with the ZLB. They added this algorithm
which generates impulse responses to news shocks to their Dynare code to derive the
extended versions of impulse responses.
The intuition for algorithm is as follows. If there is a ZLB constraint, nominal interest
rates maybe zero for some periods. The boundaries of nominal interest rate a®ect the
economic behavior. For example, if the nominal interest rate binds, output and in°ation
decrease more. These e®ects are expressed by anticipated components that are created
by news shocks. In other words, if the nominal interest rate binds, the e®ects which are
created by anticipated shocks are allocated to other macro-variables. Since news shock
is the shcok that agents know when the shock materialize, agents can behave rationally
considering the occurence of shocks. This feature is used for the behavior of an agent
who knows when the nominal rate of interest will reach the lower bound.
The HP algorithm allocates the anticipated component to macro variables by solv-
1Nakajima (2008), Fujiwara, Sudo and Teranishi (2010), and Ida (2013) analyze the optimal monetary
policy with ZLB in an open economy.
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ing the complementary condition with slackness. Impulse responses accommodating
ZLB consist of an unanticipated component and an anticipated component with weight-
parameters. Solving the complementary problem, we obtain optimal weight-parameters.
In the present analysis, I used both the HP algorithm and the piecewise linear so-
lution, which is an algorithm that interpolates impulse responses with other impulse
responses. The picewise linear solution replace the periods during which the nominal in-
terest rate might hit the lower bound with another impulse response that accommodates
the model structure which nominal interest rate binds. The period which is replaced by
another impulse response is determined by guess and verify method.
Here I use these two algorithms and analyze the e®ects of monetary policy shocks
when there is a non-negative constraint on the nominal interest rate. I employ a DSGE
model which has sticky prices, sticky wages and adjustment costs of investment. First,
I show that strong reductions in the nominal interest rate play a signi¯cant role in the
dynamics of the economy after policy shock when there is the ZLB constraint in this
model. The nominal interest rate decreases signi¯cantly when the monetary policy rule
is the Taylor type. On the other hand, the nominal interest rate decreases tvery small
when the monetary policy rule is the money growth rule.
Second, I remove the wage stickiness to test how it contributes to the e®ects of the
ZLB on monetary policy shocks under the Taylor rule. The response of the in°ation in
an economy under °exible wages becomes larger than in an economy under sticky wages.
Then, in°ation can absorb the relatively large e®ects of the ZLB on the case without the
wage stickiness. The impulse responses results indicate that e®ects of the ZLB in the
economy under °exible wages is smaller than in the economy under sticky wages.
Third, I manipulate the persistence of the monetary policy shock under the Taylor
rule. An increase in the persisitece of a monetary policy shock signi¯cantly reduces the
e®ects of the ZLB by reducing the response of the nominal interest rate. The increase in
the persistence of a monetary policy shock gives a long term feature to nominal interest
rates. This decreases the reduction in the nominal rate of interest in response to the
policy shock, and then the absence of signi¯cant easings are mitigated more so than in
the case in which the persistence of shocks is low.
In the remainder of the paper, I explain the model in Section 2, and I derive the
impulse responses by the HP algorithm and the piecewise linear solution in Section 3.
My conclusions and directions for future research are presented in Section 4.
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2 The model
I use the medium scale DSGE model, presented by Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and
Wouters (2003), and others, to analyze the e®ects of the ZLB on monetary policy shocks.
The model economy has the sectors of households, ¯nal goods ¯rms, intermediate ¯rms,
and the government . The ¯rms in the intermediate goods sector produce di®erentiated
goods and set the price following the Calvo (1987) pricing rule. Workers supply a di®er-
entiated labor force to the intermediate-goods sector. The ¯rms maximize their pro¯t as
evaluated by marginal utility following the Calvo pricing rule.
Throughout the optimization in each sector, the aggregate demand equation, the
aggregate supply with in°ation dynamics, and the labor supply equation with in°ation
and wage dynamics are derived.
The ¯scal policy is Ricardian and the central bank employs the Taylor (1993) rule
and money growth rule. The disturbance term is the only monetary policy shock in this
economy.
2.1 Households
I assume that the household is a continuum and indexed by h in (0; 1). The households
get the utility from the consumption Ct(h) and real money balances Mt(h)=Pt and gets
disutility from the labor supply Nt(h).
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
µ
Ct(h)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ +
(Mt(h)=Pt)1¡&
1¡ & ¡ ´Nt(h)
2
¶
: (1)
Where,Mt and Pt are nominal money and aggregate price, respectively. The household's
budget constraint is
PtCt(h) + PtIt(h) +Bt(h) +Mt(h)
·Wt(h)Nt(h) + rkt PtKt¡1(h) +Rt¡1Bt¡1(h) +Mt¡1(h) +Dt(h);
(2)
where, It;Kt; Bt, and Dt denote the investment, capital, government bond, and dividend
from the pro¯t, respectively. The investment assumed to follow the accumulative process
with adjustment cost.
Kt(h) = (1¡ ±)Kt¡1(h) + It(h)¡ S
µ
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¶
It(h); (3)
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where, S(¢) denotes the adjustment function of the investment and satis¯es the property
S(1) = S0(1) = 0. The household's ¯rst order conditions are as follows.
Ct(h)¡¾ = ¸t(h);
mt(h)¡& = ¸t(h)¡ ¯Et
·
¸t+1(h)
¦t+1
¸
;
¸t(h) = ¯RtEt
·
¸t+1(h)
¦t+1
¸
;
¸t(h) = Ãt(h)
·
1¡ S
µ
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¶
¡ S0
µ
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¶
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¸
+ ¯Et
"
Ãt+1(h)S0
µ
It+1(h)
It(h)
¶µ
It+1(h)
It(h)
¶2#
;
Ãt(h) = ¯Et
h
¸t+1(h)rkt+1 + Ãt+1(h)(1¡ ±)
i
:
where, ¸t and Ãt are lagrange multipliers associated with the household's budget con-
straint and capital accumulation equation, respectively. These conditions are reduced
into
1 = ¯Et
"
Rt
¦t+1
µ
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
¶¡¾#
; (4)
Rt ¡ 1
Rt
=
mt(h)¡&
Ct(h)¡¾
; (5)
qt(h) = Et
½
¸t+1
¸t
h
rkt+1 + (1¡ ±)qt+1(h)
i¾
; (6)
qt(h)
·
1¡ S
µ
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¶
¡ S0
µ
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¶
It(h)
It¡1(h)
¸
= 1¡ Et
"
qt+1(h)
¸t+1(h)
¸t(h)
S0
µ
It+1(h)
It(h)
¶µ
It+1(h)
It(h)
¶2#
;
(7)
Eq.(4) is a Euler equation which describes the household's intertemporal decision rule of
savings. Eq.(5) is money demand equation showing that the opportunity cost of holding
money equals the nominal interest rate. Eq.(6) shows the asset price determination, and
Eq.(7) is the process of the investment associated adjustment costs. The term qt denotes
Tobin's marginal q, and it is de¯ned as Ãt=¸t.
Following Erceg et, al. (2000), I focus on the symmetric equilibrium, i.e. Ct(h) =
Ct; Mt(h) = Mt; It(h) = It; Kt(h) = Kt; qt(h) = qt. Then, I log-linearize the ¯rst order
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conditions around the steady state. The resulting expressions are as follows.
ct = Etct+1 ¡ 1
¾
(rt ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ ½); (8)
rt =
¾(1¡ ¯)
¯
ct ¡ &(1¡ ¯)
¯
mt:; (9)
qt = Et¼t+1 ¡ rt + r
k
1 + rk ¡ ± r
k
t +
1¡ ±
1 + rk ¡ ±Etqt+1 (10)
it =
¯
1 + ¯
Etit+1 +
1
1 + ¯
it¡1 +
·¯
1 + ¯
qt: (11)
where, I de¯ne · ´ 1=S00(1), ½ ´ ln(¯), and all variables are log-deviated from the steady
state. Eq.(11) is the log-linearized version of Eq.(7). It is reduced into the simple form
signi¯cantly since I give the property, S(1) = S0(1) = 0, to the adjustment function,
S(¢).
2.2 Wage decision
I give the sticky wage into the labor supply. There are in¯nite continuum laborN(h; j); h; j 2
(0; 1) and the aggregate labor supply is de¯ned by
Nt(j) =
µZ 1
0
Nt(h; j)
µw¡1
µw dh
¶ µw
µw¡1
;
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(j)dj:
(12)
where, N(h; j) denotes the h type of labor supply to the ¯rm j. I de¯ne the intratemporal
pro¯t maximization problem as follows.
max
N(h;j)
WtNt(j)¡
Z 1
0
Wt(h)Nt(h; j)dh s.t. Nt(j) =
µZ 1
0
Nt(h; j)
µw¡1
µw dh
¶ µw
µw¡1
The ¯rst order condition is
N(h; j) =
µ
Wt(h)
Wt
¶¡µw
Nt(j): (13)
Eq.(13) is the demand function for h type of labor by ¯rm j. Substituting Eq.(13) into
the zero-pro¯t condition yields
Wt =
µZ 1
0
Wt(h)1¡µdh
¶ 1
1¡µw
: (14)
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Next, I de¯ne the optimal wage setting for workers. The workers set their wages to
maximize the di®erence between disutilty from the labor supply and their real wages
evaluated by marginal utility. Each worker has an opportunity to change his wage with
probability !. Then, the worker's optimization problem is de¯ned by
max
Wt(h)
Et
1X
s=0
(!¯)s
·
¸t+s(h)
Wt(h)Xt;s
Pt+s
Nt+s(h)¡ ´Nt+s(h)2
¸
;
s.t. Nt+s(h) =
Ã
~WtXt;s
Wt+s
!¡µw
Nt+s:
(15)
where,
Xt;s =
(
¦1 £¦2 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £¦t t ¸ 1
1 t = 0
I assume the indexation of the unchanged wage. Then, unchanged wages are shifted by
past in°ation ¼t¡1. The ¯rst order condition is
Et
1X
s=0
(!¯)s¸t+s(h)
"
~WtXt;s
Pt+s
¡MwNt+s(h)
¸t+s(h)
#
Nt+s(h) = 0; (16)
whereMw ´ µw=(µw¡1). From Eq.(14), the aggregate wage is given by the Dixit-Stigltz
form.
Wt =
h
(1¡ !) ~W 1¡µwt + !(¼t¡1Wt¡1)1¡µ
i 1
1¡µ (17)
There is ¼t¡1 in the second term of the bracket since I assume the indexation of unchanged
wages. Log-linearinzing Eq.(16) and Eq.(17) around the steady state and combining both
equations yield the wage Philips curve (hereafter, the WPC).
·wwt = ¯Etwt+1 + wt¡1 + ¯Et(¼t+1 ¡ ¼t)¡ (¼t ¡ ¼t¡1)
+
(1¡Mw)¾
bw!
ct ¡ 1¡Mw
bw!
nt:
(18)
where
·w ´ bw(1 + ¯°
2)¡Mw
bw!
; bw ´ 2Mw ¡ 1(1¡ !)(1¡ ¯!)
Since I assume the indexation in the wage setting, there is lagged variable in both wage
and in°ation in the WPC. The WPC denotes the relationship between wages and the
labor supply.
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2.3 Final goods sector
There is an in¯nite continuum of intermediate goods Yt(j); j 2 (0; 1). The ¯nal goods
sector produces its output by combining the intermediate goods.
Y =
µZ 1
0
Y (j)
µ¡1
µ dj
¶ µ
µ¡1
; (19)
The optimization of the ¯nal goods ¯rm is de¯ned as the intratemporal pro¯t maximiza-
tion.
max
Yt(j)
PtYt ¡
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj s.t. Yt =
µZ 1
0
Yt(j)
µ¡1
µ dj
¶ µ
µ¡1
The ¯rst order condition is
Yt(j) =
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt: (20)
Eq.(20) is the demand function for type j intermediate goods for any j 2 (0; 1). Substi-
tuting Eq.(20) into Eq.(19) yields the aggregate price index.
Pt =
µZ 1
0
P (j)1¡µdj
¶ 1
1¡µ
: (21)
2.4 Intermediate goods sector
In this subsection, I derive the dynamics of in°ation log-linearized around the steady
state. The intermediate ¯rm j has a production technology given by
Yt(j) = Kt¡1(j)®Nt(j)1¡®: (22)
By the cost minimization problem, the total cost of ¯rm's product isµ
1
1¡ ®
¶1¡®µ 1
®
¶®
(rkt )
®(wt)1¡®Yt(j);
and the marginal cost is
st =
µ
1
1¡ ®
¶1¡®µ 1
®
¶®
(rkt )
®(wt)1¡®: (23)
The real marginal cost st is independent of the index j. The intermediate ¯rm's pro¯ts
at t are replaced into ·
Pt(j)
Pt
¡ st
¸
PtYt(j):
7
The intermediate ¯rms dynamically maximize their pro¯ts evaluated by the household's
marginal utility by setting their optimal price considering that they cannot change their
price forever with probability °. I de¯ne ~Pt as the price which can be set optimal in the
period t. Then, the intermediate ¯rm's optimal price setting is
max
~Pt
Et
1X
s=0
(°¯)s¸t+s
"
~PtXt;s
Pt+s
¡ st+s
#
Pt+sYt+s(j);
s.t. Yt+s(j) =
Ã
~PtXt;s
Pt+s
!¡µ
Yt+s:
(24)
The ¯rst order condition is
Et
1X
s=0
(°¯)svt+s
"
~PtXt;s
Pt+s
¡Mst+s(j)
#
Pt+s
Ã
~PtXt;s
Pt+s
!¡µ
Yt+s = 0; (25)
where, M ´ µ=(µ ¡ 1). From Eq.(21), the aggregate price is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz
type CES aggregator and it is divided into the changed price component and the un-
changed price component.
Pt =
h
(1¡ °) ~P 1¡µt + °(¼t¡1Pt¡1)1¡µ
i 1
1¡µ (26)
Since I assume price indexation on the unchanged prices, there is the past in°ation in
the second term of the bracket. Log-linearizing Eq.(25) and Eq.(26) and combining the
two equation yield the dynamic equation of in°ation.
¼t =
¯
1 + ¯
Et¼t+1 +
1
1 + ¯
¼t¡1 +
(1¡ °)(1¡ °¯)
°(1 + ¯)
st; (27)
Equation (27) is the New Keynesian Philips curve (hereafter, the NKPC), which describes
the supply side of the economy, the terms of in°ation appear because of the sticky price
in the intermediate ¯rm sector. There is lagged in°ation in Eq. (27) since I assumed
indexiation of the unchanged prices. The e®ects of stickiness are on st, which is the
marginal cost of intermediate ¯rms. As ° becomes large, the coe±cient of st becomes
small. Moreover, the log-linear version of real maginal cost is given by
st = ®rkt + (1¡ ®)wt: (28)
The in°ation dynamics may become small since the sticky wage is present in this economy.
The sticky wage lowers the dynamics of st and then the in°ation dynamics becomes
smaller.
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2.5 Monetary policy
I derive the impulse responses to both the money growth rule and the Taylor (1993) rule.
First, when the monetary policy rule is the Taylor type,
rt = Ã¼¼t + Ãyyt + vrt ;
vrt = ½rv
r
t¡1 + ²
r
t ; ²
r
t » i.i.d (0; ¾2r ):
where, Ã¼ ¸ 1 is called `the Taylor principle'.
Second, the monetary policy is the money growth rule
¹t = ½¹¹t¡1 + ²
¹
t ; ²
¹
t » i.i.d (0; ¾2¹); (29)
where, ¹t ´ Mt ¡Mt¡1 denotes the money growth rate; Eq.(29) is the log-linearized
form. The relationship between money growth and the real money rate can be described
as follows by using the de¯nition of real balances, mt =Mt ¡ pt.
¹t = mt ¡mt¡1 + ¼t:
Finally, I give the ZLB constraint explicitly2 .
rt ¸ ¡ ln(1=¯): (30)
2.6 Aggregation
I aggregate the household's budget constraint and the intermediate ¯rms' budget con-
straint in h and j.
PtCt + PtIt +Bt +Mt =WtNt + PtrktKt¡1 +Rt¡1Bt¡1 +Mt¡1 +Dt:
Dt = PtYt ¡WtNt ¡ PrrktKt¡1:
From the above equations and the government's budget constraint, the goods market
clearing condition can be obtained.
Yt = Ct + It: (31)
2Since impulse responses indicate percent deviates from the steady state, the lower bound of the
nominal interest rate becomes ¡ ln(1=¯) in the Figures.
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2.7 Steady-state conditions
Next, I derive the steady-state conditions. First, from the equler equation,
R =
1
¯
The capital rental rate is given by
rk = R+ ± ¡ 1:
The optimal price equation at the steady state gives the steady state value of real wage,
w =
µ
(1¡ ®)1¡®®®
M(rk)®
¶ 1
1¡®
:
From the intermediate ¯rm's cost minimization problem, the output-capital ratio at the
steady state is derived as follows.
K
Y
=
µ
(1¡ ®)rk
w
¶®¡1
:
Then, the output-investment ratio for the steady state is given by capital accumulation.
I
Y
= ±
K
Y
Finally, the steady state value for C=Y is
C
Y
= 1¡ I
Y
;
3 Simulation
In this section, I derive the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock dealing with
the non-negative constraint on the nominal interest rate. First, I show the intuition
of the HP algorithm and the piecewise linear solution. Second, I show that strong
reductions in the nominal interest rate play a signi¯cant role in the dynamics of the
economy in response to the policy shock when there is a ZLB constraint in this model.
The nominal interest rate decreases signi¯cantly when the monetary policy rule is the
Taylor type under the benchmark parameters. On the other hand, the nominal interest
rate decreases to a very low rate in response to the money growth shock.
Third, I remove the wage stickiness to investigate how it contributes to the e®ects
of the ZLB in response to monetary policy shocks under the Taylor rule. The response
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of the in°ation in the economy under °exible wages becomes larger than that in the
economy under sticky wages. Then, in°ation can absorb the relatively large e®ects of
the ZLB in the case without wage stickiness. The impulse responses results indicate that
the e®ects of the ZLB in an economy under °exible wages is smaller than that in an
economy under sticky wages.
Fourth, I change the persistence of the monetary policy shock under the Taylor rule.
An increase in the persisitece of monetary policy shock signi¯cantly reduces the e®ects
of the ZLB by reducing the response of the nominal interest rate. The increase in the
persistence of the monetary policy shock gives a long term feature to nominal interest
rates. This decreases the reduction in the nominal rate of interest in response to the
policy shock, and then the absence of signi¯cant easings is mitigated more than in the
case which the persistence of shocks is low.
3.1 Algorithms dealing with the ZLB
3.1.1 The HP algorithm
I explain the HP algorithm intuitively in this subsection.3
First, I need to solve the rational expectation model. In this paper I use the `Sims
(2002) form'. Then, I derive impulse responses to unanticipated policy shocks. I de¯ne
impulse responses as Ul | where, Ul is the T £ 1 matrix, T is the period of simulation
and l corresponds to each variables in the model.
Second, I derive the impulse responses to anticipated shocks. I introduce the news
shock to the equation in which I want to set an inequality. If the ZLB constraint is
present, the nominal rates maybe zero for some periods. The HP algorithm introduces
news shocks to accommodate this. Agents know when a neews shock will materialize,
and thus the agents can behave rationally given the information about the time that
shock will occur. This structure is applied to explorations of how an economy behaves
if it knows when the nominal rate of interest binds. In other words, the HP algorithm
replaces `future ZLB' with `anticipated shock'. Holden and Paetz (2012) call this `shadow
shocks'. Shadow shocks are added into equations which include inequality-constrained
variables because we want to know how the economy behaves in response to the dynamics
of the nominal interest rate.
In this paper, I add the shadow shock term to the Taylor rule and to the money
3See Holden and Paetz (2012) for more details.
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growth rule.
rt = Ã¼¼t + Ãyyt + vrt +
T ¤¡1X
s=0
vnt;s (32)
or
rt = ¾ct + &mt +
T ¤¡1X
s=0
vnt;s (33)
where, vnt;s denotes news shocks. v
n
t;s is a shock which is known at t¡ s and materializes
at t. For example, vnt;s is expressed as follows in an AR(1) system when s = 3.
xt = ½xxt¡1 + vt + vnt;3;
vnt;3 = news3t24news3tnews2t
news1t
35 =
24news2t¡1news1t¡1
²
35
(34)
Thus
PT ¤¡1
s=0 v
n
t;s means there are T
¤ systems like (34). In other words, we must derive
all impulse responses to shocks ² since we need all behavior of an agent when nominal
rates are binding, where, T ¤ · T . Using a news shock algorithm, I derive the extended
version of impulse responses. I de¯ne impulse responses to news shock as Al, where l
denotes each variable, and Al are T £ T ¤ matrices.
Next, I derive the impulse responses dealing with ZLB. The HP algorithm uses the
idea of complementary conditions employing slack variables. First, it is necessary to
de¯ne the impulse responses. The result of the impulse response of the nominal rate
must satisfy
rzt = maxf¡ ln(1=¯); rtg: (35)
Holden and Paetz (2012) converted the form of Eq.(35) into the following parameter
weighted form.
rzt = Ur;t + ln(1=¯) +Ar;t®: (36)
where, Ur is the impulse response of the nominal interest rate to an unanticipated policy
shock and Ar denotes the impulse responses to T ¤ news shocks. ® is a T ¤ £ 1 vector.
Thus, the impulse responses accommodating the ZLB constraint consist of unanticipated
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and anticipated components. The anticipated component is ampli¯ed by ® to deal with
rt + ln(1=¯) ¸ 0.
Eventually, the problem is replaced to ¯nd the optimal value of parameter vector ®.
Holden and Paetz (2012) uses the idea of a complmentary slackness type condition,
®>(Ur + ln(1=¯) +Ar®) = 0 (37)
and then de¯ne the problem;
®¤ =arg min ®>(Ur + ln(1=¯) +Ar®)
s.t. ® ¸ 0; Ur + ln(1=¯) +Ar® ¸ 0:
(38)
If the objective function is close to zero, it regards ®¤ as satisfying the complementary
condition. MATLAB has a quadratic optimization function quadprog.m in its opti-
mization toolbox. Since quadprog.m requires the initial value of ® and ®¤ is obtained
only when the objective function converges to zero, it is necessary to change the initial
value of ® or the number of news shocks impulse responses if the objective function does
not converge zero.
Finally, the responses dealing with ZLB for each variables are obtained as follows.
Ul +Al®¤; (39)
3.1.2 The piecewise linear solution
Here, I explain piecewise linear solution, which was used by Jung, Teranishi and Watan-
abe (2005) analyze the optimal monetary policy with ZLB. Guerierri and Iacoviello (2013)
created the MATLAB codes for the piecewise linear solution. They provide the codes on
the web.4
The piecewise linear solution is an algorithm that replaces periods in which the nom-
inal rate might bind with another impulse responses at which the nominal interest rate
binds. The algorithm needs two regimes as follows:
AEtXt+1 +BXt + CXt¡1 + FEt = 0; (40)
A¤EtXt+1 +B¤Xt + C¤Xt¡1 +D¤ = 0; (41)
where, Xt is a vertical vector of variables. D¤ is a vertical vector which includes the
deviated threshold value from the steady state at which the nominal interest rate binds.
4See Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013) for more details. They provide Dynare codes.
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® ¯ ° ! µ µw Ã¼ Ãy ½¹ ½r
0:3 0:99 0:7 0:8 6 6 1:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
Table 1: Calibration
A;B;C; F;A¤; B¤ and C¤ are structual matrices that include coe±cients. I suppose that
Eq.(40) satis¯es the Blanchard-Kahn condition and the inequality constraint does not
bind. The rational expected solution for this regime is
Xt = ©Xt¡1 +ªEt: (42)
I also suppose that regime (41) does not always satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn condition
and the inequality constraint always binds. Now I suppose that an agent guesses that
regime (41) starts from Ts and ¯nishes at Tf . The guessed solution for [Ts; Tf ] is obtained
as follows: Since the agent guessed that regime (41) ¯nishes at Tf , the solution (42) is
applied after Tf . Then, EtXTf+1 = ªXTf . Substituting this into Eq.(41) yields
XTf = ©TfXTf¡1 + ¡Tf : (43)
where,
©Tf ´ ¡(A¤ª+B¤)¡1C¤; ¡Tf ´ ¡(A¤ª+B¤)¡1D¤ (44)
Iterating this process, we obtain ©t and ¡t for all t 2 [Ts; Tf ]. The path can then be
simulated and veri¯ed. If the guessed solution is not veri¯ed, another guess can be tried
by changing the value of Ts, Tf or both.
3.2 Benchmark impulse response
I set the deep parameters as the listed in Table 1. First, I simulate the model with the
Taylor rule. I construct the vector of variables as follows.
Xt ´
£
rt; ct; it; yt; ¼t; nt; wt; kt¡1; rkt ; st; qt;
Etct+1; Et¼t+1; Etwt+1; Etr
k
t+1; Etit+1; Etqt+1; v
r
t
¤> (45)
Figure 1 illustrates the impulse response to the monetary easing shock when the policy
rule is the Taylor type. I set the value of the policy shock so that the nominal interest
rate responds to ¡1 at minimum. The solid blue line in the ¯gure indicates the impulse
responses without the ZLB constraint. Since the easing policy stimulate the economy,
the decrease in the nominal interest rate raises the labor supply, output, in°ation and
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under the Taylor rule. Solid blue
line: the impulse response without the ZLB; Solid purple line: the impulse response with
the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; Dashed green line: the impulse response with
the ZLB by the HP algorithm.
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investment. The responses of these variables, especially in°ation and investment, are
relatively small compared to the response of the nominal interest rate. Even though the
responses of the labor supply and the output are larger than that of the nominal interest
rate, they are not as large as twice the response of the nominal interest rate. Thus,
the response of the nominal interest rate is not greatly di®erent from those of the other
variables.
In Figure 1, the dashed green and solid purple line show the impulse responses ob-
tained by the HP algorithm and the piecewise linear solutions. The result from these two
methods are extremely close. Figure 1 indicates that the nominal interest rate stays at
the lower bound until the 4th quarter and then becomes small positive. This describes
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. The dynamics of the other variables
change dramatically toward the result without the ZLB constraint. The responses of all
of the variables decrease markedly. The interpretation maybe as follows. The central
bank gives the monetary policy shock to stimulate the economy and then the nominal
interest rate decreases. If there is the ZLB constraint, however, the nominal interest rate
can no longer decrease under zero. This means that the nominal interest rate is not able
to ease signi¯cantly because of the ZLB. The absence of signi¯cant easing a®ects the
other macro variables delaying the positive response of the nominal interest rate further
and further. The nominal interest rate's return to a positive status is delayed one quarter
in this model toward the case without the ZLB constraint.
Next, I simulate the model with the money growth rule.
Xt ´
£
rt; mt; ct; it; yt; ¼t; nt; wt; kt¡1; rkt ; st; qt;
Etct+1; Et¼t+1; Etwt+1; Etr
k
t+1; Etit+1; Etqt+1; ¹t
¤> (46)
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to the positive shock under the money growth
rule. Similar to the result obtained with the Taylor rule, the easing policy in the money
growth rule stimulates the economy and increase all of the variables indicated in Figure
2. The positive money growth shock lowers the nominal interest rate. This is called the
`liquidity e®ect', which is de¯ned as the negative relationship between money growth and
the nominal interest rate. In the theoretical literature, the occurrence of the liquidity
e®ect depends negatively on the persistence of money growth rate (Christiano et al. 1997).
I set the money growth persistence, ½¹, at 0:5 to generate as strong a liquidity e®ect
as possible. The response of the nominal interest rate is very small relative to those
of the other macro variables. Both the dashed green line and the solid purple line
in Figure 1 indicate the impulse responses dealing with the non-negative constraint.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under the money growth rule.
Solid blue line: the impulse response without the ZLB; Solid purple line: the impulse
response with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; Dashed green line: the impulse
response with the ZLB by the HP algorithm.
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Table 2:
Variables Taylor rule
max(PW) max(HP) max(IRF)
yt 0:075585 0:081866 0:85686
it 0:12439 0:13501 0:579
nt 0:10742 0:11695 1:2241
¼t 0:020795 0:021413 0:082309
max(PW): maximum responses with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; max(HP): maxi-
mum responses with the ZLB by the HP algorithm; max(IRF): maximum responses without the
ZLB to monetary policy shocks for each variables.
Table 3:
Variables Money growth rule
max(PW) max(HP) max(IRF)
yt 115:3241 115:8718 117:2244
it 228:1931 233:1472 230:1629
nt 163:5437 164:3163 166:2422
¼t 37:4943 36:7371 37:7284
max(PW): maximum responses with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; max(HP): maxi-
mum responses with the ZLB by the HP algorithm; max(IRF): maximum responses without the
ZLB to monetary policy shocks for each variables.
The impulse response of the nominal rate binds the zero lower bound for ¯rst 1 to
7 quarters and reaches the lower bound again for 17 quarters. The nominal interest
rate could not ease signi¯cantly because of the ZLB. The result of this insigni¯cant
easing in the nominal interest rate spills over and then lowers the response of the other
variables. However, the reductions in responses are extremely small. This is re°ected by
the extreme closeness of the solid blue line, the solid purple line and the dashed green
line. Next I compare the e®ect of zero lower bound between the Taylor rule and the
money growth rule. First, I compare the maximum responses of four variables. Tables
2 and 3 indicate the maximum responses of yt; it; nt and ¼t to each monetary policy
shock. The columns labeled max(PW) and max(HP) indicate the maximum value of
responses to the monetary policy shock in the HP algorithm and the piecewise linear
solution. The colunmns of max(IRF) indicate the maximum value of responses to the
monetary policy shock without constraint. The result from max(PW) and max(HP) are
close to each other. In Table 2, the results from max(PW) and max(HP) are less than
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Table 4: The E®ects of ZLB indicate
PjIRF¡ZIRFj/PjIRFj for each variables.
variables Taylor rule Money growth rule
E®ects of ZLB PW HP PW HP
yt 80:4885% 78:2123% 1:6348% 4:2977%
it 74:3258% 71:8679% 1:0829% 4:5272%
nt 82:1438% 80:4424% 1:5695% 3:8598%
¼t 70:6225% 69:5775% 1:0385% 3:1222%
those of max(IRF). On the other hand, the results from max(PW) and max(HP) are
close to max(IRF) in Table 3. Thus, the maximum responses to monetary policy shocks
are more greatly a®ected by the non-negative constraint on the nominal interest rate
under the in Taylor rule than under the money growth rule.
Second, I compare the e®ect of the zero lower bound in impulse responses for 20
periods.
20X
t=0
jIRFt ¡ PWtj=
20X
t=0
jIRFtj and
20X
t=0
jIRFt ¡HPtj=
20X
t=0
jIRFtj
Table 4 indicates that the e®ects of constraint are much larger under the Taylor rule
than the money growth rule. The responses with constraint were about 70%-80% of
the size of the responses without constraint under the Taylor rule. The responses with
constraint were about 1%-4% of the size of the responses without constraint under the
money growth rule.
3.3 Flexible wages
Next, I derive the impulse responses without the wage stickiness. Since there is no
stickiness in wage, the version of the Philips curve equation is substituted for the labor
supply equation from which the household's ¯rst order conditions are derived. The log-
linearized version is
nt + ¾ct = wt: (47)
Figure 3 indicates the impulse responses to the negative monetary policy shock under
the Taylor rule. Some standard responses without sticky wages become larger than the
responses with sticky wages and others do not. The response of the nominal interest
rate with a °exible wages rate is smaller than that of the nominal interest rate with
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under the Taylor rule and °exible
wages. Solid blue line: the impulse response without the ZLB; Solid purple line: the
impulse response with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; Dashed green line: the
impulse response with the ZLB by the HP algorithm.
20
Table 5:
variables Maximum responses E®ects of ZLB
max(PW) max(HP) max(IRF) PW HP
yt 0:46998 0:5136 0:99972 42:2759% 38:4409%
it 0:3045 0:32513 0:43061 25:9485% 24:1256%
nt 0:67139 0:73371 1:4282 41:3739% 37:1486%
¼t 0:45146 0:47694 0:62137 23:2359% 27:5527%
max(PW): maximum responses with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; max(HP): maxi-
mum responses with the ZLB by the HP algorithm; max(IRF): maximum responses without the
ZLB to monetary policy shocks under °exible wages. The columns of E®ects of ZLB indicatePjIRF¡ZIRFj/PjIRFj for each variable, where, the monetary policy rule is the Taylor type.
sticky wages. Table 5 indicates the maximum responses to the monetary policy shock
in some variables. The standard maximum response of in°ation becomes much larger
than that with sticky wages. This feature is consistent with the study by Christiano et
al. (2005) in that the nominal rigidities, especially the wage rigidity, contributes to the
initial dynamics of in°ation.
The responses with the ZLB constraint become larger than those with sticky wage.
The intuitive reason for the reduction in the e®ects of the ZLB is that the in°ation
dynamics becomes larger because of the absence of sticky wage. The in°ation can abosorb
the e®ects of the constraint more than before since the dynamics of in°ation become
larger. Table 5 provides the sticky wage versions of Tables 2, 3 and 4. First, the
maximum responses of variables with the constraint are more close to max(IRF) than
the case with sticky wages. Second, the e®ects of the constraint decrease in all variables.
Thus, the e®ects of monetary policy shock under the Taylor rule with frexible wages are
larger than those with the sticky wages.
3.4 The persistency in policy shock under the Taylor rule
The persistency in policy shock under the Taylor rule, ½r, contributes to the dynamics
of the nominal interest rate. Figure 4 indicates the impulse responses when ½r is 0:9.
The impulse response of the nominal intrerest rate with the ZLB stays zero for initial
periods, but it departs from zero earlier than the case without the ZLB. The responses
of other variables with the ZLB became close to those without the ZLB. An increase
in the persistence of policy shock lowers the negative response of the nominal interest
rate because high persistence of policy shock indicates that monetary easing continues
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under the Taylor rule when
½r = :9. Solid blue line: the impulse response without the ZLB; Solid purple line: the
impulse response with the ZLB by the piecewise linear solution; Dashed green line: the
impulse response with the ZLB by the HP algorithm.
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longer and the nominal interest rate takes on a long term aspect in the model. These
results indicate that an increase in the persistence of policy shock under the Taylor rule
dramatically mitigates the e®ects of ZLB through the reduction of the response of the
nominal interest rate.
4 Conclusion and Future Task
The main ¯nding of this paper is that the in°uence of the ZLB on the e®ects of monetary
policy shock under the Taylor rule is larger than under the money growth rule in a typical
DSGE model. The reduction in the nominal interest rate is small compared to the money
growth shock. The ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate has little e®ect on the
other variables because of the insigni¯cant negative responses of the nominal interest
rate to money growth shocks. In other words, the ZLB does not a®ect the economy so
much because of the weak liquidity e®ect. However, this result is unrealistic because
there might be a strong liquidity e®ect in the actual economy. It is thus important to
use models that can generate a strong liquidity e®ect. This implication is related to the
third analysis described herein, which assessed the e®ects of ZLB in high persistence of
shocks to Taylor rule. The ZLB might have a signi¯cant e®ect on the impact of monetary
policy shocks under the Taylor rule in models that generate strong liquidity e®ects even
though shock persistence is high.
Second, °exible wages reduce the e®ects of the ZLB and increase some variables'
responses. Wage stickiness a®ects the dynamics of in°ation through the marginal costs
of the intermediate goods sector. A reduction in the stickiness of wages raises in°ation
and then reduces the response of the nominal interest rate. A decrease in the response of
nominal rate of interest mitigates the ampli¯cation of the e®ects of anticipated bindings in
the HP algorithm, but this result does not necessally indicate that reduce wage stickiness
is good method of decreasing the e®ects of the ZLB. This issue should be explored further
in the ¯eld of optimal monetary policy.
Third, the results obtained with the HP algorithm and those obtained with the
piecewise linear solution are close to each other in all analyses in this model.
Finally, these results are not necessarily consistent with the traditional IS-LM liter-
ature since monetary policy shocks a®ect the economy under some cases. This result
may indicate that the model cannot explain the real economy or that monetary policy
is e®ective even though the nominal interest rate cannot decrease further than zero. It
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is, however, di±cult to suggest the latter implication. As noted in above, it is important
to search for a way to greatly reduce response of of the nominal interest rate to the
money growth shocks. The e®ects of monetary policy employing the Taylor rule might
become close to completely ine®ective in such models. The liquidity e®ect might be more
important, because of the ZLB.
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